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Abstract 
In a free-entry Cournot oligopoly model with a quadratic utility function that 
yields differentiated products, it is shown that there are losses from trade when 
the trade cost is close to the prohibitive level. Although the total number of 
varieties increases, there is a reduction in consumer surplus. This occurs 
because trade leads to an increase in imported varieties where consumer 
surplus is low due to the high trade cost and a decrease in domestically-
produced varieties where consumer surplus is high. This result is in contrast 
with results from the free-entry Cournot oligopoly models with homogeneous 
products of Brander and Krugman (1983) and Venables (1985); the 
monopolistic competition models such as Krugman (1980) and Venables 
(1987), and heterogeneous firm models such as Melitz (2003) and Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008). 
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 1. Introduction 
An important source of gains from trade identified by the new trade theory is the increase 
in product variety available to consumers. The gains from increased variety were first 
demonstrated by Krugman (1979) using a monopolistic competition model with a general love 
of variety utility function and by Krugman (1980) using a CES utility function that became 
standard in the literature. In a monopolistic competition model with trade costs, Venables 
(1987) showed that there were unambiguously gains from trade due to increased variety. In the 
new new trade theory with heterogeneous firms started by Melitz (2003), there were aggregate 
productivity gains as well as the gains from increased variety. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
used a quadratic utility function and found that there were gains from increased variety as well 
as the aggregate productivity gains. Although, according to Arkolakis et al. (2008) and 
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) these new sources of the gains from trade 
have not affected the magnitude of the estimated gains from trade. 
In the literature on international trade under Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous 
products, Brander and Krugman (1983) and Venables (1985) considered the case when there 
is free entry and exit of firms. They demonstrated that there were always gains from trade 
whatever the level of trade costs, due to the pro-competitive effect of international trade. In a 
Cournot oligopoly model with differentiated products and free entry, but with zero trade costs, 
Bernhofen (2001) showed that trade increased the number of varieties and had a pro-
competitive effect on prices.1 
                                                 
1 Marjit and Mukherjee (2015) consider a Cournot oligopoly model with differentiated products where there 
is free entry of domestic firms that compete with a single foreign firm only in the domestic market. They show 
that a reduction in trade costs may lead to a decrease in consumer surplus, but domestic firms do not export to the 
foreign country and a reduction in the trade cost has no effect on the prices set by domestic firms in their model. 
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In this note, international trade will be analysed in a free-entry Cournot oligopoly model 
with a quadratic utility function that yields differentiated products, and it is shown that there 
are losses from trade when trade costs are close to the prohibitive level. 
2. The Cournot Oligopoly Model 
Suppose that there are two symmetric countries, a home country labelled as A  and a 
foreign country labelled as B . In each country, there is an imperfectly competitive industry 
producing differentiated products and a perfectly competitive industry producing a 
homogeneous good using a constant returns to scale technology. The imperfectly competitive 
industry consists of identical firms that each have a constant marginal cost c  and a fixed cost 
F . Free entry and exit of firms ensures that profits are equal to zero in equilibrium and, 
ignoring the integer constraint, this determines the number of firms n  in each country. There 
is also a per-unit trade cost t , which may be a real trade cost, such as a transport cost, or an 
import tariff that generates revenue for the country. Since the two countries are symmetric and 
all the firms are identical, the equilibria in the two countries will be symmetric. Therefore, the 
analysis will derive the equilibrium in the home country then exploit the symmetry between 
the two countries to work out the equilibrium number of firms and the welfare effects of 
international trade. The quantity sold by the ith oligopolistic firm from country ,C A B  in the 
home country is 
Cix , and the price it receives is Cip . The quantity of the numeraire good sold 
in the home country is z  and its price is normalised at unity, 1zp  . It is assumed that there is 
a representative consumer in each country with quasi-linear preferences that can be represented 
by a quadratic utility function, adapted from Vives (1985): 
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where 0c   , 0   and  0,1 is the degree of product substitutability. Note that this 
utility function exhibits the same love of variety effect as the CES utility function. Utility 
maximisation by the representative consumer yields the inverse demand facing the ith 
oligopolistic firm from each of the two countries in the home country: 
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   (2) 
Since the utility function is quasi-linear, consumer surplus is a valid measure of consumer 
welfare that in the home country is given by: 
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Since the foreign oligopolistic firms face the per-unit trade cost t  when they supply the 
market in the home country, the gross profits in the home country of the ith firm from each of 
the two countries are: 
    Ai Ai Ai Bi Bi Bip c x p c t x       (4) 
The gross profits of the firms in the market of the foreign country are defined analogously 
except that the home firms now face the trade cost. 
3. The Free-Entry Cournot Equilibrium under Autarky 
Under autarky, there is no trade with the foreign country so the home country only 
consumes the goods produced by the home firms. Solving for the symmetric Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium, taking the number of firms as given, yields the output, price and gross profits of 
each firm: 
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           2 22 1 2 1 2 1A A Ac ccx p cn n n                 (5) 
Setting net profits 0A A F    then solving for the equilibrium number of firms under 
autarky, while ignoring the integer constraint, yields: 
    where 2 0NAn c F
F
           (6) 
Assuming that 0   or    2 22F c      then substituting (6) into (5) yields the 
free-entry Cournot-Nash equilibrium output and price under autarky: 
 N NA AFx p c F    (7) 
Welfare of the home country under autarky is given by the sum of consumer surplus plus 
the profits of the home firms, but profits are zero in equilibrium, therefore using (3), (6) and 
(7) yields autarky welfare: 
       2 212 2N N N N N N NA A A A A A AW CS n x n n x c F              (8) 
4. The Free-Entry Cournot Equilibrium with International Trade 
If the two countries open up to international trade multilaterally then firms in the home 
country can export their products to the foreign country and consumers in the home country 
can buy imported products from the foreign firms. The inverse demand functions facing the 
firm are given by (2) and the gross profits of the firms are given by (4) in the market of the 
home country. Hence, the first-order conditions for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium with 
international trade in the home country are: 
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Since all the home firms are symmetric they will all produce the same quantity in the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, 
Ai Aj Ax x x  , receive the same price, Ai Aj Ap p p  , and earn the 
same profits 
Ai Aj A     in the market of the home country. Similarly, since all the foreign 
firms are symmetric: 
Bi Bj Bx x x  , Bi Bj Bp p p   and Bi Bj B     in the market of the 
home country. Also, symmetry implies that the number of firms in each country will be the 
same in the two countries in equilibrium. Solving for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, taking the 
number of firms as given, yields the output of each firm: 
                 2 2 122 2 2 1 2 2 2 1A B c n tc n tx xn n                             (10) 
The total net profits of a home firm are equal to the sum of gross profits in the two countries 
minus the fixed cost, *
A A A F     , where *A  is the gross profits of a home firm from 
exporting to the foreign country and, by symmetry, this is equal to the gross profits of a foreign 
firm from exporting to the home country, *
A B  . Therefore, the total net profits of a home 
firm are: 
       2 22 2212 22 2 1A c t t Fn            (11) 
Setting 0A   and solving for the equilibrium number of firms, which is the same in both 
countries, while ignoring the integer constraint, yields: 
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       2 22 2 where 2 2 02T c tn F t                (12) 
Therefore, substituting (12) into (10) yields the free-entry Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
outputs with international trade: 
    2 2 2 2T TA Bt tx x          (13) 
Note that the trade cost will be prohibitive so that there will be no trade, 0TBx  , if 
0t    , and hence, using the definition of   from (12), the prohibitive trade cost is  2t F   . 
5. Welfare Effects of International Trade 
The welfare effects of international trade can now be analysed by comparing the 
equilibrium with international trade with the equilibrium under autarky. Using symmetry 
together with (12) and (13) in (3), the consumer surplus of the home country with international 
trade is: 
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 (14) 
If a fraction   of the trade cost is a tariff, then the tariff revenue of the home country is  ,T T TA BR t tn x  . Since profits are equal to zero in equilibrium, the welfare of the home 
country is the sum of consumer surplus and tariff revenue: 
           , , 24T T T TA A A A t tW t CS t R t CS c t               (15) 
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Consider the case of totally free trade analysed by Bernhofen (2001) where the trade cost 
is equal to zero, 0t  , so there is no tariff revenue.2 It is straightforward to show that a move 
from autarky to free trade will increase welfare: 
          0, 2 21 24T NA AW c F c F W             (16) 
Now consider the case when the trade cost is positive and, in particular, the case when the 
trade cost is close to the prohibitive level. Welfare with international trade (relative to welfare 
under autarky) is plotted in figure one as a function of the trade cost (for the parameter values: 
50  , 1  , 1 3  , 10c   , 20F  , and 150, ,1  ). Obviously, when the trade cost is 
prohibitive, t t , the equilibrium in each country will be exactly the same as under autarky 
and therefore welfare will be exactly the same as under autarky,  ,T NA AW t W  . A reduction 
in the trade cost evaluated at the prohibitive level, t t , will lead to a reduction in the number 
of firms in both countries since, using (12),  2 0Tn t F        . The effect on the 
welfare of the home country is obtained by differentiating (15) and evaluating at the prohibitive 
trade cost: 
     1 2 22 2TA
t t
W
t
          (17) 
A reduction in trade costs will decrease (increase) welfare if this derivative is positive 
(negative), which will be the case if the fraction of the trade cost that is a tariff      * 1 2 2        . Note that *  is decreasing in the degree of product 
                                                 
2 Proposition 3 of Bernhofen (2001) does not explicitly prove that there are gains from trade, but shows that 
trade increases the number of varieties, reduces price-cost margins and increases the output of each firm. 
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substitutability,  , from * 1 4   when the products are independent, 0  , to * 0   when 
the products are homogeneous, 1  . These results lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition: When products are differentiated,  0,1 , and the trade cost is close to the 
prohibitive level, there are losses (gains) from trade for both countries if   *   . 
Consider the case when trade costs are real and there is no tariff revenue, 0  , then (17) 
is strictly positive if products are differentiated,  0,1  and equal to zero, as in Venables 
(1985), if products are homogeneous, 1  . Therefore, with differentiated products, welfare is 
upward-sloping at the prohibitive trade cost as shown in figure one and there will be a range of 
values for the trade cost,  ,t t t , where welfare with international trade is lower than welfare 
under autarky so there are losses from trade. The explanation is that the increased competition 
with international trade reduces the profits of the home firms and leads to the exit of some 
firms. As a result, consumers have fewer domestically-produced varieties, and the imported 
varieties provide little consumer surplus as consumption of these varieties is infinitesimally 
small. Since the model is symmetric, both countries will lose from trade if the trade cost is 
close to the prohibitive level. The critical values for the trade cost t  and t  are plotted in figure 
two as functions of the degree of product substitutability,  , for the same parameters as in 
figure one, and it can be seen that the region where there are losses from trade becomes larger 
as the products become more differentiated. 
Now consider the case when the trade cost is an import tariff that generates revenue for 
the government, 1  , then (17) is always strictly negative and there are always gains from 
trade as shown in figure one. In this case, the loss of consumer surplus when the trade cost is 
reduced is outweighed by the gain from the tariff revenue. When only a fraction of the trade 
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cost is a tariff, the gain in tariff revenue outweighs the loss of consumer surplus if *   and 
there will always be gains from trade as shown in figure one. 
6. Conclusions 
This note has demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade in a free-entry Cournot 
oligopoly model with differentiated products when the trade cost is close to the prohibitive 
level despite an increase in the total number of varieties available to consumers. The gains from 
the availability of imported varieties are outweighed by the loss of domestically-produced 
varieties as consumption of each of the imported varieties is infinitesimally small when the 
trade cost is close to the prohibitive level. Since the model is symmetric, both countries will 
lose from trade if the trade cost is close to the prohibitive level. 
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